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ABSTRACT 
 
The complex rules and inter-related choices regarding spousal and survivor benefits imbedded in 
the social security system make the optimization of lifetime benefits for married couples a complex 
decision which can reduce or increase lifetime benefits significantly—even hundreds of thousand 
dollars.  This paper focuses on strategies for couples with above average age differences and with 
ratios of Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) of 0.5 or better.  In regards to age differences, about 
40% of marriages have 4 or more years in age difference between spouses.  The difference of four 
or more years is important because it means that one spouse is at or past full retirement age 
(FRA) when the other spouse becomes 62.  Since both spouses must be eligible for regular social 
security benefits (past 62 years of age) to jointly execute an optimization strategy, the time period 
to execute strategies for couples is reduced by above average age differences.  This paper 
evaluates the financial benefits of three major strategies for couples with above average age 
differences and with PIA ratios of 0.5 or more: (1) Use “Restricted application” for spousal 
benefits; (2) Delay start of benefits until one spouse has reached 70 years of age; and; (3) Early 
start for benefits as soon as the youngest spouse reaches 62 years of age.  Each strategy is 
affected by the differences of age between the individual spouses, their individual work records 
(PIA ratio), and their individual life expectancies.  The analytical framework presented in this 
paper illustrates that couples can increase life time benefits by hundreds of thousands of dollars 
by choosing the appropriate strategy.   
 
Keywords:  Optimizing Social Security Benefits for Married Couples 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he complex rules and inter-related choices regarding spousal and survivor benefits imbedded in the 
social security system make the optimization of life-time benefits for married couples a rather 
intricate strategy selection decision.  A number of books and articles are available to assist 
individuals in their choice of benefits and timing of start of benefits (Clements, 2009; Crawford and Lilien, 1981; 
Fahlund, 2009). 
 
However, “Innumerable studies over the past decade have shown that many people lack the basic 
knowledge of the Social Security system necessary for making informed decisions about when to retire and claim 
benefits, a decision which will impact their savings and their overall financial security” (Rand Corp, 2010).  Also, 
Kiplinger’s Social Security Solutions states “Making the best possible selections related to your Social Security 
options can mean a material difference in the income it provides to you over the course of your retirement years.”  
Kiplinger provides examples that show how a less than optimal choice may cost beneficiaries tens of thousands of 
dollars in forgone income. 
T 
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The selection of the correct strategy depends upon many factors such as the difference in ages of spouses 
(Johnson, 2002), the relative benefits of each spouse based upon their personal social security record (Muksian, 
2011), the health of each spouse, the availability of suitable employment, the expected life span of each spouse 
(Henkens and Solinge, 2002), the cash needs of the couple, and other social network considerations such as children, 
grandchildren, etc.  Clearly, optimization across so many variables is a complex evaluation. 
 
As noted above, there are numerous studies and reference materials available to help couples make an 
informed decision.  Many valuable resources are included in the bibliography attached to this paper. However, 
because of the large, perhaps infinite combinations of choices, to provide examples applicable to all situations is 
impossible.   
 
In particular, examples of optimization tend to be sparse in which couples have above average age 
differences and retirement benefits within 50% of each other based upon their individual work records.  One reason 
for the relative dearth of examples is that as the spousal age difference increases, fewer interactive strategies for 
optimization are available.  For example, if a couple has more than 8 years of age difference, one spouse will be at 
70 years of age before the other is eligible for social security benefits.  There is no increase in benefits deferring past 
70 years of age, and except for survivorship, care of minor children, and disability, there is little opportunity to take 
benefits before 62 years of age.  Consequently, there are fewer examples of optimization strategies and references 
for couples with age differences of just 5 years or more.   
 
STRATEGY OPTIONS FOR COUPLES 
 
There are two basic strategies available for couples reaching retirement age: (1) “Claim and suspend” and 
(2) “Restricted application” (Nolo, 2012).   “Claim and suspend” works for couples in which one spouse’s 
dependent’s benefits are less than 50% of the other spouse’s full retirement benefits.  In “claim or suspend” (or as it 
is often referred to as “file and suspend”), the worker “A”, who is at full retirement age, files for benefits but 
suspends receipt of payments.  The other spouse “B” can then file for spousal benefits on the record of spouse “A”. 
The “claim and suspend” strategy will not work if spouse “B” is not yet 62 or if spouse “B” has retirement benefits 
on their own record of at least 50% of the benefits of the suspending spouse (“A”).     
 
The “claim and suspend” strategy is widely discussed in social security reference books and pamphlets.  
However, our analysis of strategies employs assumptions that make the “claim and suspend” strategy unrewarding.  
Because of the greater labor force participation of women, many baby boomer husbands and wives have significant 
individual work records  Our assumptions that both spouses have retirement benefits, with the ratio of benefits 
(lower divided by higher)  at 0.5 or greater, precludes the use of “claim and suspend” strategy.  In addition, the 
length of time in which most interactive strategy options can be implemented becomes shorter as the average age 
difference grows.  In fact, as noted earlier, with 8 years age difference or greater, and with each spouse having 
similar benefits (a ratio of 0.5 or greater), both the “claim and suspend” strategy and the “restricted application” 
strategy become unrewarding.  
    
To use the strategy of “restricted application”, at least one spouse must be at full retirement age and the 
average age difference must be less than 8 years.  At full retirement age, either spouse can claim either full 
retirement or full dependent benefits.  In “restricted application”, the spouse who is less than FRA and who has the 
lower retirement benefits, decides to begin retirement (not spousal) benefits, which permits the spouse who is at full 
retirement age to receive dependent (spousal) benefits.  In practice, it is usually the younger spouse who files for 
their social security retirement benefits, usually at 62, and it is the older spouse who files for dependent benefits on 
the work record of the younger spouse.  Because the older spouse did not start benefits on his own record, the older 
spouses continues to gain delayed retirement credits until the older spouse files for retirement benefits at 70 years of 
age.  
 
At this point, some social security jargon must be introduced.  The primary insurance amount (PIA) is the 
monthly income provided to the beneficiary at full retirement age (FRA).  For individuals born between the years 
1943-1954, the full retirement age is 66.  (However, the FRA will increase gradually until 2027 when 67 years of 
age becomes FRA.) The PIA is calculated by formula from the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), which 
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is based upon the worker’s highest earnings, selecting the best 35 years during the working life.   The worker’s 
earnings before age 60 are indexed to reflect the average increase in wage level in the U.S., making the earnings 
comparable over time.   
 
The PIA formula for 2013 is: PIA = (0.9 X the first $791 of AIME) + (0.32 of the next $3,977 of AIME) + 
(0.15 X the remainder of AIME).   Clearly, the formula favors lower income earners with the lower earnings most 
heavily weighted.  Note that for every $1000 in AIME above $4,768, only $150 is added to PIA.  Once over the 
amount of $4,768 additional income is weighted at 15%.  The low weighting at the higher income levels tends to 
diminish differences in benefits between higher income earners versus middle income earners.  The PIA formula is 
adjusted every year. For more information, the reader can go to www.ssa.gov.  
 
For the purposes of our analysis, the spouse with the lowest PIA is assumed to have a PIA equal to or 
greater than half of the primary insurance amount (PIA) of the spouse with the larger PIA.  In other words, the ratio 
of the spouses’ PIA’s (lower PIA/ higher PIA) must be 0.5 or greater.    
 
It should be noted that both strategies--- “claim and suspend” and “restricted application”---require at least 
one spouse to be of full retirement age (FRA) and the other spouse to be at least 62 years of age.  In the “claim and 
suspend” strategy, the spouse at FRA claims and suspends retirement benefits.  The younger spouse (at least 62 
years of age) files for spousal benefits.  Spousal benefits are paid at 50% of the claiming spouse’s PIA.  Also, when 
the spouse is age 62, the spousal benefit is reduced to 75% of the full spousal benefit because of early benefit 
reduction.  Consequently, the spousal benefit, for couples with a 0.5 ratio or greater, becomes less than the 
retirement benefit available on the younger spouse’s work record.   
 
For example, Bill, 67 years of age, has a primary insurance amount (PIA) of $2375/mo.  His wife, Sandra, 
62, has a PIA of $1450/mo.  Sandra will have to take her retirement benefit of 0.75 x $1450 = $1087.50, which is 
more than the amount available for dependent spousal benefits under Bill’s record (0.5 x 0.75 x $2375 = $890.63.)  
In other words, there is no benefit to Bill filling and suspending benefits in order for Sandra to receive spousal 
benefits.  Sandra will receive more from retirement benefits on her record than from claiming spousal benefits on 
Bill’s record.    
 
Note, that since Bill is 5 years older than his spouse, he could adopt the “restricted application” strategy 
and receive 50% of Sandra’s $1450/month (=$725/month) until he claims retirement benefits with delayed 
retirement credits (DRC) at 70 years of age.    (DRC increase benefits about 8% per year.  The maximum DRC for 
delaying start of benefits from FRA (66) until 70 years of age is 32%). In Bill’s case, the “restricted application” 
provides a monthly benefit of $1812.50 (=$1,087.50 +$725) and he gains DRC which will provide him a retirement 
benefit of $3,135 at 70 years of age ($3,135 = 1.32 X PIA= 1.32 X $2375). 
 
However, if Bill were 8 years older than his spouse, he would have to claim his retirement benefits of 
$3135/month (= $2375/month x 1.32 given delayed retirement credits (DRC) of 32%).  Sandra would have the 
choice of filing for retirement benefits or waiting.  Her retirement benefit remains at $1087.50/month if she files at 
62 and her spousal benefit remains at $890.63 despite Bill’s increased retirement benefit from delayed retirement 
credits.  The spousal benefit is based upon the other spouse’s PIA only and does not include DRC.  However, when 
Bill dies, Sandra, if she is at full retirement age, will receive 100% of Bill’s retirement benefits of $3135/month.  
Survivor’s benefits include DRC.    
 
As the previous example illustrates, an important consideration for couples is the survivor benefit (O’Rand 
and Parkas, 2002; Fisher, 2007; Burtless, 1986) which includes delayed retirement credits (DRC).  The widow, at 
FRA, will receive 100% of the deceased spouse’s retirement benefits including the DRC (Landis, 2012).   Another 
important issue to consider is the couple’s cash requirements.  If the couple can utilize the “restricted application”, 
the couple can receive retirement and spousal benefits, usually on the younger spouse’s work record.  The “restricted 
application” permits the other spouse to build their monthly benefit by DRC until 70 years of age. If the couple has a 
high ratio of retirement benefits, the “claim and suspend” strategy provides less income than the “restricted 
application” strategy.  As noted above, many wives and husbands today have similar retirement benefits (ratio above 
0.5).  For couples with a 0.5 ratio or greater, the “claim and suspend” strategy is relatively unrewarding and the 
“restricted application” strategy is comparatively superior.   
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FOCUS OF PAPER 
 
This paper focuses on strategies for couples whose retirement benefits have a ratio of 0.5 or better (lower 
PIA/higher PIA) and who have an above average age differences between spouses.  First, consider age differences. 
Looking at Table 1 reveals that about 40% of marriages have 4 or more years in age difference between spouses.    
Furthermore, about 31.2% of marriages have 5 or more years in age difference between spouses. The example 
strategies provided in most social security references assume a smaller age difference.  The difference of four or 
more years is important because it means that one spouse is at or past full retirement age (FRA) when the other 
spouse becomes 62.  Since most optimizing strategies require both spouses to be eligible for regular social security 
benefits (past 62 years of age), and at least one spouse to be at FRA, the time period to execute strategies for 
optimization for interactive couples’ benefits is reduced by age differences beyond 4 years.    
 
Table 1 
Married Couples By Differences In Ages Between Husband And Wife: 1999 
Age Differences All Married Couples (000’s) Percent Distribution 
   
Total 55,849 100.0 
   
Husband 20 or more years older than wife 447 0.8 
Husband 15 to 19 years older than wife 830 1.5 
Husband 10 to 14 years older than wife 2,735 4.9 
Husband 6 to 9 years older than wife 6,891 12.3 
Husband 4 to 5 years older than wife 7,687 13.8 
Husband 2 to 3 years older than wife 12,321 22.1 
Husband and wife within one year 18,096 32.4 
   
Wife 2 to 3 years older than husband 3,320 5.9 
Wife 4 to 5 years older than husband 1,622 2.9 
Wife 6 to 9 years older than husband 1,222 2.2 
Wife 10 to 14 years older than husband 480 0.9 
Wife 15 to 19 years older than husband 112 0.2 
Wife 20 or more years older than husband 87 0.2 
US Census Bureau, Based upon Current Population Survey 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/ 
 
In the calculated tables to follow, the lower income spouse has a PIA of $1478 based upon a work record of 
20 years of “substantial earnings”.  Social security provides a table which shows the amount of dollars needed in 
every year since 1937 to qualify for “substantial earnings”.  “Substantial earnings” are important in the calculation 
of the WEP (Windfall Elimination Provision).  The WEP was instituted to reduce the benefits of double dipping by 
pensioners.  For more information, the reader is referred to SSA Publication No. 05-10045, January 2012, ICN 
460275.  In our calculated tables, the lower income spouse has a small pension of $444/ month based upon working 
as a teacher in a school system which did not participate in social security.  The WEP extracts a penalty of 50% 
($222/month) of the teacher’s pension from the social security benefit.  Although the WEP adjustment is not very 
large, it is included to provide an illustration of the WEP consideration in social security optimization strategies 
(Blankenship, 2011).  
 
STRATEGIES AND ASSUMPTIONS   
 
This paper evaluates the financial benefits of three major strategies for couples with above average age 
differences and with spouses having PIA’s equal or greater than 0.5 ratio based upon their individual AIME on their 
work records.  The strategies are: (1) Use “Restricted application” for spousal benefits; (2) Delay start of benefits 
until one spouse has reached 70 years of age; and; (3) Early start for benefits as soon as the youngest spouse reaches 
62 years of age.  For strategies 2 and 3, it is assumed that both spouses will begin benefits on their own work record 
at the same time.  By beginning benefits at the same time, spouses can start benefits when both spouses are believed 
to have finished working.    
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At this point, let us review the age difference assumption underlying the calculations for the tables to 
follow in this paper. For the purpose of this paper, an age difference of five (5) years is assumed.  The husband or 
wife may be the older spouse.  The choice of five years reflects several considerations.  First, the percentage of 
marriages with age difference between zero and nine years is 91.5%.  Since the interval includes all of the ninth year 
until the beginning of the tenth year, five years is in the middle of the range.  Second, if we make the assumption 
that the age differences are normally distributed and interpolate the interval for 4 to 5 years on Table 1, the total area 
between +5 and -5 (wife older) is about .688, which implies that the a standard deviation of 1.0 occurs at about 5 
years.  Also, and important for the decision making analysis necessary for optimization of social security benefits, 
the five year period requires decisions to be made by the couples considering that when one spouse is past FRA, the 
younger spouse may not yet be 62.     
 
DESCRIPTION OF STRATEGIES 
 
We explore three main strategies in this analysis.  Strategy 1 uses the “restricted application”.  In strategy 1, 
the individual (spouse “B”), who is assumed to have the lowest primary insurance amount (PIA) on their own 
record, begins benefits at 62.  The other spouse “A” (at or past FRA) makes a “restricted application” for spousal 
benefits which permits “A” to gain monthly benefits immediately on “B”’s record, but allows “A” to receive 
delayed retirement credits (DRC).   DRC add about 8% per year to monthly benefits.   In strategy 1, both “A” and 
“B” receive benefits on “B”s record until “A” reaches 70 years of age and begins receipt of monthly benefits at the 
higher DRC rate.  “B” continues to receive benefits at the earlier established amount.  Strategy 1 works best for 
couples where “B” has become unemployed with few prospects for future full time employment, has little likelihood 
of exceeding the $14,640 earnings limit (2012), but who has substantial social security benefits on their own record.   
 
In strategy 2, individual “A”, who is the oldest, delays until 70 years of age to start benefits at the higher 
DRC rate (waiting until 70 years of age increases monthly benefits to about 132% of PIA at FRA). The youngest 
spouse “B” waits until near full retirement age.  By this strategy, the youngest spouse can receive near 100% of their 
PIA at FRA.  It is generally not rewarding for “B” to wait until 70 years of age to collect DRC.  The younger spouse 
is more likely to collect survivor benefits which are 100% of the older spouse’s benefits including the DRC.  
Strategy 2 is best for couples in which both spouses are still employed, have long life expectancies, and who have 
sufficient funds to postpone early receipt of social security benefits. 
 
In strategy 3, both individuals begin benefits on their own record when the youngest spouse “B” can start 
benefits. The assumption here is that the highest wage earner can work until both spouses are eligible for social 
security benefits.  When the youngest spouse reaches 62, the older spouse retires at 67 (given the 5 year age 
difference.)  This strategy permits some increased individual and survivor benefits from DRC and early access to 
benefits for the younger spouse.  Strategy 3 maximizes life time income for couples who have above average age 
differences, who have qualified for social security on their own records, who have below average life expectancies, 
and who can afford to live on their combined social security benefits.  
 
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE COMPUTATIONAL TABLES 
 
To analysis the three strategies, Tables 2 through 13 show the computation of annual benefits and their 
accumulation over the expected live span of the couple.  Four different life spans of spouse “A” are used: 75 years, 
80 years, 85 years, and 90 years.  Spouse “B” is expected to live to 90.  (Based upon current mortality tables, there is 
a strong likelihood of at least one spouse living to 90 years of age.)  Benefits are assumed paid until the last day of 
the terminal year. The average age difference is assumed to be 5 years, with “A” being the older spouse.   
 
The PIA’s for A and B are $2371/month and $1478/month respectively.  The PIA’s are based on 35 years 
AIME for “A” and an AIME with 20 years of “substantial earnings” for “B”.  It is assumed that “B” had 5 years 
working for a government agency in which no social security taxes were paid and a small independent pension of 
$444 was gained.   The Windfall Elimination Provision reduces “B”s retirement benefit by 50% or $222.  No 
adjustment for inflation is provided because social security benefits are adjusted for inflation (Duggar and 
Gillingham, 1999; Hobjin and Lagakos, 2003).  It has been the goal of Congress to maintain the “real” benefits of 
social security by cost of living adjustments (COLA).    
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To simplify the computations, each spouse will gain benefits throughout the whole year of that age and that 
the years are consistent between spouses.  That is, referring to strategy 1, Table 2, when spouse “A” receives an 
annual benefit of $7536 at age 67, the spouse “B” at age 62, also receives an annual benefit of $11,304 the same 
year. 
 
For strategy 1, spouse “A” receives 50% of spouse “B”s retirement benefit.  The 50% amount is based 
upon the social security rule for spousal benefit at full retirement age.  If spouse “A” was less than FRA, the benefit 
would be reduced.  Because Spouse “B” is only 62, the retirement benefit is reduced to 75% of the net retirement 
benefit after reduction by WEP.   The annual benefit for “A” is $7536 (= 12 X 0.5 X $(1478-222)).  The annual 
benefit for “B” is $11,304 (= 12 X (1478-222) X 0.75).  When spouse “A” turns 70 years of age, the annual benefit 
increases to $37,557 (=12 X 1.32 X 2371). 
 
For strategy 2, spouse “A” does not take benefits until 70 years of age.  Spouse “B” waits until 65 to begin 
benefits.  Spouse “A” has annual benefits at 70 of $37,557 (= 12 X 1.32 X 2371).  Spouse “B” has annual benefits of 
$14,067 (= 12 X 0.9333 X 1256).  The factor 0.9333 reflects “B”s retirement benefit reduction because “B” is 65, or 
one year less than full retirement age.   Strategy 2 evaluates whether a couple meeting our assumptions of age and 
PIA ratio should delay taking social security benefits. 
 
For strategy 3, spouse “A” begins their retirement benefits when the younger spouse “B” can begin taking 
their retirement benefits.  Spouse “A” has annual benefits of $30,728 (= 12 X 1.08 X 2371).  The factor 1.08 reflects 
the DRC gained by delaying beginning benefits by one year.   The annual benefits for “B” are $11,304 (= 12 X 
(1478-222) X 0.75).  Strategy 3 evaluates whether a couple meeting our assumptions of age and PIA ratio should 
begin social security benefits as soon as the younger spouse is eligible. 
 
ANALYSIS OF CALCULATED TABLES FOR STRATEGY 1 
 
Strategy 1 uses the “restricted application” strategy.   To briefly describe, at least one spouse (”A”) must be 
at FRA.  The younger partner (spouse “B”) begins retirement benefits at 62.  Spouse “A” makes a “restricted claim” 
for dependent spousal benefits which permits “A” to gain monthly income immediately on “B”’s record, but allows 
“A” to gain delayed retirement credits (DRC).   
 
A primary advantage of strategy 1 is that it permits spouse “A” to maximize retirement benefits using 
delayed retirement credits (DRC).  These enhanced benefits will provide increased income to spouse “A” and then 
pass to the other spouse when spouse “A” dies.  Another advantage is that the couple begins receiving some benefits 
from social security immediately reducing the opportunity cost of delayed retirement benefits for spouse “A”.   
 
The strategy 1 works best for couples in which the younger spouse is unlikely to find full time employment 
again, is unlikely to have earnings which exceed the $14,640 limit, has a lower PIA than the older spouse, and has a 
long life expectancy.  If the survivor is at FRA, the survivor benefit is 100% of the deceased spouse’s full retirement 
benefit which includes DRC.  In other words, for husbands and wives with above average age differences, the older 
spouse’s enhanced retirement benefits are received by the younger spouse for their entire remaining life.  For 
optimization from the couple’s perspective, the couple receives the enhanced retirement benefit for spouse “A”s life 
and subsequently, for spouse “B”s remaining life.  Given that most mortality estimates for couples suggest that at 
least one will live to 90 years of age, the enhanced retirement benefit from DRC persists until the death of both 
spouses. 
 
An important caveat: the underlying assumption for strategy 1 is that the older spouse also has the higher 
PIA.  If the younger spouse has the higher PIA, other strategies should be explored.  However, the examples used in 
this paper are meant to be representative of the majority of couples who have an above average age difference and a 
PIA ratio (lower PIA/higher PIA) equal to or greater than 0.5.  In many couples, the older spouse, usually the 
husband, has the larger PIA and the lower life expectancy.  
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Looking at Table 2, Strategy 1 for 75/90, spouse “A”, age 67, and spouse “B”, age 62, receive benefits of 
$7,536 and $11,304 respectively for a total annual benefit of $18,840.   When spouse “A” reaches 70 years of age, 
the annual benefit rises to $37,557 (given the DRC) for a total combined benefit for the couple of $48,861.  The 
higher total benefit continues until “A” dies and spouse “B” begins receiving survivor benefits of $37,557 at 71 
years of age.  The annual benefit of $37,557 continues until “B” dies after 90 years.  The cumulative benefits for the 
couple are $349,684 at the end of age 75 for spouse “A” and are $1,100,817 for the couple at the end of age 90 for 
spouse “B”. 
 
Table 2 - Strategy 1 75/90 - Restricted Application 
B” Begins Retirement Benefits and “A” Begins Spousal Benefits on “B”s Record 
Age Benefits 
Spouse A Spouse B Annual A Annual B Total Cumulative 
67 62 $7,536 $11,304 $18,840 $18,840 
68 63 $7,536 $11,304 $18,840 $37,680 
69 64 $7,536 $11,304 $18,840 $56,520 
70 65 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $105,381 
71 66 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $154,241 
72 67 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $203,102 
73 68 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $251,963 
74 69 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $300,823 
75 70 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $349,684 
76 71 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $387,240 
77 72 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $424,797 
78 73 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $462,354 
79 74 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $499,910 
80 75 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $537,467 
81 76 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $575,024 
82 77 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $612,580 
83 78 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $650,137 
84 79 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $687,694 
85 80 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $725,250 
86 81 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $762,807 
87 82 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $800,364 
88 83 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $837,920 
89 84 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $875,477 
90 85 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $913,033 
91 86 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $950,590 
92 87 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $988,147 
93 88 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,025,703 
94 89 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,063,260 
95 90 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,100,817 
Table assumes PIA of $2,371 (A) and PIA of $1,478(B).  DRC =1.32.  WEP (B) = $222.  “B” starts at 62 which reduces benefits to 0.75 of 
PIA(B).  Age of death is 75 (spouse A) and 90 (spouse B). 
 
Tables  3, 4, and 5 illustrate strategy 1 for the spousal ages of 80/90, 85/90 and 90/90,  As in Table 2,  
spouse “A”, age 67, and spouse “B”, age 62, receive benefits of $7,536 and $11,304 respectively for a total annual 
benefit of $18,840.   When spouse “A” reaches 70 years of age, the annual benefit rises to $37,557 (given the DRC) 
for a total combined benefit for the couple of $48,861.  The higher total benefit continues until “A” dies and spouse 
“B” begins receiving survivor benefits of $37,557. The annual benefits of $37,557 continue until “B” dies after 90 
years.   
 
The cumulative benefits for the couple who survives to 80/90 (Table 3) are $593,987 at the end of age 80 
for spouse “A” and are $1,157,337 for the couple at the end of age 90 for spouse “B”.  The cumulative benefits for 
the couple who survives to 85/90 (Table 4) are $838,290 at the end of age 85 for spouse “A” and are $1,213,857 for 
the couple at the end of age 90 for spouse “B”.  The cumulative benefits for the couple who survives to 90/90 (Table 
5) are $1,082,593 at the end of age 90 for spouse “A” and are $1,270,377 for the couple at the end of age 90 for 
spouse “B”. 
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Table 3 - Strategy 1 80/90 - Restricted Application 
B” Begins Retirement Benefits and “A” Begins Spousal Benefits on “B”s Record 
Age Benefits 
Spouse A Spouse B Annual A Annual B Total Cumulative 
67 62 $7,536 $11,304 $18,840 $18,840 
68 63 $7,536 $11,304 $18,840 $37,680 
69 64 $7,536 $11,304 $18,840 $56,520 
70 65 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $105,381 
71 66 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $154,241 
72 67 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $203,102 
73 68 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $251,963 
74 69 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $300,823 
75 70 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $349,684 
76 71 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $398,544 
77 72 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $447,405 
78 73 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $496,266 
79 74 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $545,126 
80 75 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $593,987 
81 76 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $631,544 
82 77 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $669,100 
83 78 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $706,657 
84 79 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $744,214 
85 80 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $781,770 
86 81 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $819,327 
87 82 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $856,884 
88 83 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $894,440 
89 84 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $931,997 
90 85 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $969,553 
91 86 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,007,110 
92 87 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,044,667 
93 88 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,082,223 
94 89 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,119,780 
95 90 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,157,337 
Table assumes PIA of $2,371 (A) and PIA of $1,478(B).  DRC =1.32.  WEP (B) = $222.  “B” starts at 62 which reduces benefits to 0.75 of 
PIA(B).  Age of death is 80 (spouse A) and 90 (spouse B). 
 
Table 4 - Strategy 1 85/90 - Restricted Application 
B” Begins Retirement Benefits and “A” Begins Spousal Benefits on “B”s Record 
Age Benefits 
Spouse A Spouse B Annual A Annual B Total Cumulative 
67 62 $7,536 $11,304 $18,840 $18,840 
68 63 $7,536 $11,304 $18,840 $37,680 
69 64 $7,536 $11,304 $18,840 $56,520 
70 65 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $105,381 
71 66 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $154,241 
72 67 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $203,102 
73 68 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $251,963 
74 69 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $300,823 
75 70 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $349,684 
76 71 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $398,544 
77 72 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $447,405 
78 73 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $496,266 
79 74 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $545,126 
80 75 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $593,987 
81 76 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $642,848 
82 77 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $691,708 
83 78 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $740,569 
84 79 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $789,430 
85 80 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $838,290 
86 81 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $875,847 
87 82 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $913,404 
88 83 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $950,960 
89 84 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $988,517 
90 85 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,026,073 
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91 86 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,063,630 
92 87 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,101,187 
93 88 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,138,743 
94 89 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,176,300 
95 90 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,213,857 
Table assumes PIA of $2,371 (A) and PIA of $1,478(B).  DRC =1.32.  WEP (B) = $222.  “B” starts at 62 which reduces benefits to 0.75 of 
PIA(B).  Age of death is 85 (spouse A) and 90 (spouse B). 
 
Table 5 - Strategy 1 90/90 - Restricted Application 
B” Begins Retirement Benefits and “A” Begins Spousal Benefits on “B”s Record 
Age Benefits 
Spouse A Spouse B Annual A Annual B Total Cumulative 
66 61     
67 62 $7,536 $11,304 $18,840 $18,840 
68 63 $7,536 $11,304 $18,840 $37,680 
69 64 $7,536 $11,304 $18,840 $56,520 
70 65 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $105,381 
71 66 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $154,241 
72 67 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $203,102 
73 68 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $251,963 
74 69 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $300,823 
75 70 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $349,684 
76 71 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $398,544 
77 72 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $447,405 
78 73 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $496,266 
79 74 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $545,126 
80 75 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $593,987 
81 76 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $642,848 
82 77 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $691,708 
83 78 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $740,569 
84 79 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $789,430 
85 80 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $838,290 
86 81 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $887,151 
87 82 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $936,012 
88 83 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $984,872 
89 84 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $1,033,733 
90 85 $37,557 $11,304 $48,861 $1,082,593 
91 86 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,120,150 
92 87 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,157,707 
93 88 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,195,263 
94 89 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,232,820 
95 90 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,270,377 
Table assumes PIA of $2,371 (A) and PIA of $1,478(B).  DRC =1.32.  WEP (B) = $222.  “B” starts at 62 which reduces benefits to 0.75 of 
PIA(B). - Age of death is 90 (spouse A) and 90 (spouse B). 
 
ANALYSIS OF CALCULATED TABLES FOR STRATEGY 2 
 
Strategy 2 evaluates whether a couple meeting our assumptions of age differences and PIA ratio should 
delay taking social security benefits.  For strategy 2, spouse “A” does not take benefits until 70 years of age.  Spouse 
“B” waits until 65 to begin benefits.   Spouse “A” has annual benefits at 70 of $37,557 (= 12 X 1.32 X 2371).  
Spouse “B” has annual benefits of $14,067 (= 12 X 0.9333 X 1256).  The factor 0.9333 reflects “B”s retirement 
benefit reduction because “B” is 65, or one year less than full retirement age.    
 
Looking at Table 6, Strategy 2 for 75/90, spouse “A” does not take benefits until 70 years of age.  Spouse 
“B” waits until 65 to begin benefits.   Spouse “A” has annual benefits at 70 of $37,557 (= 12 X 1.32 X 2371).  
Spouse “B” has annual benefits of $14,067 (= 12 X 0.9333 X 1256).  The factor 0.9333 reflects “B”s retirement 
benefit reduction because “B” is 65, or one year less than full retirement age.  The combined benefit for the couple is 
$51,623.  The higher total benefit continues until “A” dies and spouse “B” begins receiving survivor benefits of 
$37,557 at 71 years of age.  The annual benefit of $37,557 continues until “B” dies after 90 years.  The cumulative 
benefits for the couple are $309,740 at the end of age 75 for spouse “A” and are $1,060,873 for the couple at the end 
of age 90 for spouse “B”. 
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Table 6 - Strategy 2 75/90 - Delay Start Of Benefits 
Highest PIA Spouse Starts Benefits at 70; Other Spouse Begins Benefits at 65 
Age Benefits 
Spouse A Spouse B Annual A Annual B Total Cumulative 
66 61     
67 62 $0 $0 $0 $0 
68 63 $0 $0 $0 $0 
69 64 $0 $0 $0 $0 
70 65 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $51,623 
71 66 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $103,247 
72 67 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $154,870 
73 68 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $206,493 
74 69 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $258,117 
75 70 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $309,740 
76 71 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $347,297 
77 72 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $384,853 
78 73 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $422,410 
79 74 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $459,967 
80 75 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $497,523 
81 76 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $535,080 
82 77 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $572,637 
83 78 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $610,193 
84 79 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $647,750 
85 80 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $685,306 
86 81 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $722,863 
87 82 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $760,420 
88 83 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $797,976 
89 84 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $835,533 
90 85 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $873,090 
91 86 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $910,646 
92 87 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $948,203 
93 88 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $985,760 
94 89 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,023,316 
95 90 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,060,873 
Table assumes PIA of $2,371 (A) and PIA of $1,478(B).  DRC =1.32.  WEP (B) = $222.  “B” starts at 65 which reduces benefits to 0.9333 of 
PIA(B).  Age of death is 75 (spouse A) and 90 (spouse B). 
 
Tables 7, 8, and 9 illustrate strategy 2 for spousal ages of 80/90, 85/90 and 90/90.  As in Table 6, spouse 
“A” does not take benefits until 70 years of age.  Spouse “B” waits until 65 to begin benefits.   Spouse “A” has 
annual benefits at 70 of $37,557 (= 12 X 1.32 X 2371).  Spouse “B” has annual benefits of $14,067 (= 12 X 0.9333 
X 1256).  The combined benefit for the couple is $51,623.  The higher total benefit continues until “A” dies and 
spouse “B” begins receiving survivor benefits of $37,557 at 81 years of age.  The annual benefit of $37,557 
continues until “B” dies after 90 years.   
 
Table 7 - Strategy 2 - 80/90 - Delay Start Of Benefits 
Highest PIA Spouse Starts Benefits at 70; Other Spouse Begins Benefits at 65 
Age Benefits 
Spouse A Spouse B Annual A Annual B Total Cumulative 
66 61     
67 62 $0 $0 $0 $0 
68 63 $0 $0 $0 $0 
69 64 $0 $0 $0 $0 
70 65 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $51,623 
71 66 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $103,247 
72 67 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $154,870 
73 68 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $206,493 
74 69 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $258,117 
75 70 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $309,740 
76 71 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $361,363 
77 72 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $412,987 
78 73 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $464,610 
79 74 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $516,233 
80 75 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $567,857 
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81 76 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $605,413 
82 77 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $642,970 
83 78 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $680,527 
84 79 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $718,083 
85 80 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $755,640 
86 81 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $793,197 
87 82 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $830,753 
88 83 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $868,310 
89 84 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $905,866 
90 85 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $943,423 
91 86 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $980,980 
92 87 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,018,536 
93 88 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,056,093 
94 89 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,093,650 
95 90 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,131,206 
Table assumes PIA of $2,371 (A) and PIA of $1,478(B).  DRC =1.32.  WEP (B) = $222.  “B” starts at 65 which reduces benefits to 0.9333 of 
PIA(B).  Age of death is 80 (spouse A) and 90 (spouse B). 
 
The cumulative benefits for the couple who survives to 80/90 (Table 7) are $567,857 at the end of age 80 
for spouse “A” and are $1,131,206 for the couple at the end of age 90 for spouse “B”.  Similarly, the cumulative 
benefits for the couple who survives to 85/90 (Table 8) are $825,973 at the end of age 85 for spouse “A” and are 
$1,201,540 for the couple at the end of age 90 for spouse “B”.  The cumulative benefits for the couple who survives 
to 90/90 (Table 9) are $1,084,090 at the end of age 90 for spouse “A” and are $1,271,873 for the couple at the end of 
age 90 for spouse “B”. 
 
Table 8 - Strategy 2 - 85/90 - Delay Start Of Benefits 
Highest PIA Spouse Starts Benefits at 70; Other Spouse Begins Benefits at 65 
Age Benefits 
Spouse A Spouse B Annual A Annual B Total Cumulative 
66 61     
67 62 $0 $0 $0 $0 
68 63 $0 $0 $0 $0 
69 64 $0 $0 $0 $0 
70 65 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $51,623 
71 66 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $103,247 
72 67 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $154,870 
73 68 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $206,493 
74 69 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $258,117 
75 70 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $309,740 
76 71 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $361,363 
77 72 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $412,987 
78 73 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $464,610 
79 74 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $516,233 
80 75 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $567,857 
81 76 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $619,480 
82 77 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $671,103 
83 78 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $722,727 
84 79 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $774,350 
85 80 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $825,973 
86 81 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $863,530 
87 82 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $901,087 
88 83 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $938,643 
89 84 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $976,200 
90 85 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,013,757 
91 86 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,051,313 
92 87 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,088,870 
93 88 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,126,427 
94 89 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,163,983 
95 90 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,201,540 
Table assumes PIA of $2,371 (A) and PIA of $1,478(B).  DRC =1.32.  WEP (B) = $222.  “B” starts at 65 which reduces benefits to 0.9333 of 
PIA(B).  Age of death is 85 (spouse A) and 90 (spouse B). 
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Table 9 - Strategy 2 - 90/90 - Delay Start Of Benefits 
Highest PIA Spouse Starts Benefits at 70; Other Spouse Begins Benefits at 65 
Age Benefits 
Spouse A Spouse B Annual A Annual B Total Cumulative 
66 61     
67 62 $0 $0 $0 $0 
68 63 $0 $0 $0 $0 
69 64 $0 $0 $0 $0 
70 65 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $51,623 
71 66 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $103,247 
72 67 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $154,870 
73 68 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $206,493 
74 69 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $258,117 
75 70 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $309,740 
76 71 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $361,363 
77 72 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $412,987 
78 73 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $464,610 
79 74 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $516,233 
80 75 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $567,857 
81 76 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $619,480 
82 77 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $671,103 
83 78 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $722,727 
84 79 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $774,350 
85 80 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $825,973 
86 81 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $877,597 
87 82 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $929,220 
88 83 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $980,843 
89 84 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $1,032,467 
90 85 $37,557 $14,067 $51,623 $1,084,090 
91 86 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,121,647 
92 87 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,159,203 
93 88 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,196,760 
94 89 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,234,317 
95 90 $0 $37,557 $37,557 $1,271,873 
Table assumes PIA of $2,371 (A) and PIA of $1,478(B).  DRC =1.32.  WEP (B) = $222.  “B” starts at 65 which reduces benefits to 0.9333 of 
PIA(B).  Age of death is 90 (spouse A) and 90 (spouse B). 
 
ANALYSIS OF CALCULATED TABLES FOR STRATEGY 3 
 
Strategy 3 evaluates whether a couple meeting our assumptions of age differences and PIA ratio should 
begin social security benefits as soon as the younger spouse is eligible.  For strategy 3, spouse “A” begins their 
retirement benefits when the younger spouse “B” can begin taking their retirement benefits.  Spouse “A” has annual 
benefits of $30,728 (= 12 X 1.08 X 2371).  The factor 1.08 reflects the DRC gained by delaying beginning benefits 
by one year.   The annual benefits for “B” are $11,304 (= 12 X (1478-222) X 0.75).   
 
Looking at Table 10, Strategy 3 for 75/90, spouse “A” begins their retirement benefits when the younger 
spouse “B” can first begin taking their retirement benefits.  Spouse “A” has annual benefits of $30,728 (= 12 X 1.08 
X 2371).  The factor 1.08 reflects the DRC gained by delaying beginning benefits by one year.   The annual benefits 
for “B” are $11,304 (= 12 X (1478-222) X 0.75).  The total annual benefit for the couple is $42,032. The higher total 
benefit continues until “A” dies and spouse “B” begins receiving survivor benefits of $30,728 at 71 years of age.  
The annual benefits of $30,728 continue until “B” dies after 90 years.  The cumulative benefits for the couple are 
$378,289 at the end of age 75 for spouse “A” and are $992,853 for the couple at the end of age 90 for spouse “B”. 
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Table 10 - Strategy 3 - 75/90 - Early Start Of Benefits 
Begin Social Security Benefits When Youngest Partner Become Eligible On Their Record 
Age Benefits 
Spouse A Spouse B Annual A Annual B Total Cumulative 
66 61     
67 62 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $42,032 
68 63 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $84,064 
69 64 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $126,096 
70 65 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $168,129 
71 66 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $210,161 
72 67 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $252,193 
73 68 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $294,225 
74 69 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $336,257 
75 70 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $378,289 
76 71 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $409,018 
77 72 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $439,746 
78 73 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $470,474 
79 74 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $501,202 
80 75 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $531,930 
81 76 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $562,658 
82 77 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $593,387 
83 78 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $624,115 
84 79 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $654,843 
85 80 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $685,571 
86 81 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $716,299 
87 82 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $747,027 
88 83 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $777,756 
89 84 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $808,484 
90 85 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $839,212 
91 86 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $869,940 
92 87 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $900,668 
93 88 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $931,396 
94 89 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $962,124 
95 90 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $992,853 
Table assumes PIA of $2,371 (A) and PIA of $1,478(B).  DRC =1.08.  WEP (B) = $222.  “B” starts at 62 which reduces benefits to 0.75 of 
PIA(B).  Age of death is 75 (spouse A) and 90 (spouse B). 
 
Tables 11, 12 and 13 illustrate strategy 3 for 80/90, 85/90, and 90/90.  As in Table 10, spouse “A” begins 
retirement benefits when the younger spouse “B” can first begin taking retirement benefits.  Spouse “A” has annual 
benefits of $30,728 (= 12 X 1.08 X 2371).  The annual benefits for “B” are $11,304 (= 12 X (1478-222) X 0.75).  
The total annual benefit for the couple is $42,032. The higher total benefit continues until “A” dies and spouse “B” 
begins receiving survivor benefits of $30,728 at 76 years of age.  The annual benefits of $30,728 continue until “B” 
dies after 90 years.   
 
The cumulative benefits for the couple who survive to 80/90 (Table 11) are $588,450 at the end of age 80 
for spouse “A” and are $1,049,373 for the couple at the end of age 90 for spouse “B”.  Similarly, the cumulative 
benefits for the couple who survives to 85/90 (Table 12) are $798,611 at the end of age 85 for spouse “A” and are 
$1,105,893 for the couple at the end of age 90 for spouse “B”.  The cumulative benefits for the couple who survives 
to 90/90 (Table 13) are $1,008,772 at the end of age 90 for spouse “A” and are $1,162,413 for the couple at the end 
of age 90 for spouse “B”. 
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Table 11 - Strategy 3 - 80/90 - Early Start Of Benefits 
Begin Social Security Benefits When Youngest Partner Become Eligible On Their Record 
Age Benefits 
Spouse A Spouse B Annual A Annual B Total Cumulative 
66 61     
67 62 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $42,032 
68 63 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $84,064 
69 64 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $126,096 
70 65 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $168,129 
71 66 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $210,161 
72 67 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $252,193 
73 68 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $294,225 
74 69 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $336,257 
75 70 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $378,289 
76 71 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $420,322 
77 72 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $462,354 
78 73 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $504,386 
79 74 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $546,418 
80 75 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $588,450 
81 76 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $619,178 
82 77 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $649,907 
83 78 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $680,635 
84 79 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $711,363 
85 80 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $742,091 
86 81 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $772,819 
87 82 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $803,547 
88 83 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $834,276 
89 84 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $865,004 
90 85 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $895,732 
91 86 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $926,460 
92 87 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $957,188 
93 88 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $987,916 
94 89 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $1,018,644 
95 90 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $1,049,373 
Table assumes PIA of $2,371 (A) and PIA of $1,478(B).  DRC =1.08.  WEP (B) = $222.  “B” starts at 62 which reduces benefits to 0.75 of 
PIA(B).  Age of death is 80 (spouse A) and 90 (spouse B). 
 
Table 12 - Strategy 3 - 85/90 - Early Start Of Benefits 
Begin Social Security Benefits When Youngest Partner Become Eligible On Their Record 
Age Benefits 
Spouse A Spouse B Annual A Annual B Total Cumulative 
66 61     
67 62 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $42,032 
68 63 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $84,064 
69 64 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $126,096 
70 65 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $168,129 
71 66 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $210,161 
72 67 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $252,193 
73 68 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $294,225 
74 69 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $336,257 
75 70 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $378,289 
76 71 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $420,322 
77 72 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $462,354 
78 73 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $504,386 
79 74 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $546,418 
80 75 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $588,450 
81 76 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $630,482 
82 77 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $672,515 
83 78 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $714,547 
84 79 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $756,579 
85 80 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $798,611 
86 81 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $829,339 
87 82 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $860,067 
88 83 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $890,796 
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89 84 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $921,524 
90 85 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $952,252 
91 86 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $982,980 
92 87 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $1,013,708 
93 88 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $1,044,436 
94 89 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $1,075,164 
95 90 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $1,105,893 
Table assumes PIA of $2,371 (A) and PIA of $1,478(B).  DRC =1.08.  WEP (B) = $222.  “B” starts at 62 which reduces benefits to 0.75 of 
PIA(B).  Age of death is 85 (spouse A) and 90 (spouse B). 
 
Table 13 - Strategy 3 - 90/90 - Early Start Of Benefits 
Begin Social Security Benefits When Youngest Partner Become Eligible On Their Record 
Age Benefits 
Spouse A Spouse B Annual A Annual B Total Cumulative 
66 61     
67 62 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $42,032 
68 63 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $84,064 
69 64 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $126,096 
70 65 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $168,129 
71 66 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $210,161 
72 67 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $252,193 
73 68 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $294,225 
74 69 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $336,257 
75 70 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $378,289 
76 71 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $420,322 
77 72 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $462,354 
78 73 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $504,386 
79 74 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $546,418 
80 75 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $588,450 
81 76 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $630,482 
82 77 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $672,515 
83 78 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $714,547 
84 79 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $756,579 
85 80 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $798,611 
86 81 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $840,643 
87 82 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $882,675 
88 83 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $924,708 
89 84 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $966,740 
90 85 $30,728 $11,304 $42,032 $1,008,772 
91 86 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $1,039,500 
92 87 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $1,070,228 
93 88 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $1,100,956 
94 89 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $1,131,684 
95 90 $0 $30,728 $30,728 $1,162,413 
Table assumes PIA of $2,371 (A) and PIA of $1,478(B).  DRC =1.08.  WEP (B) = $222.  “B” starts at 62 which reduces benefits to 0.75 of 
PIA(B).  Age of death is 80 (spouse A) and 90 (spouse B). 
 
COMPARISON OF STRATEGIES 
 
A comparison of the three strategies is shown in Table 14, Comparison Of Strategies.  The maximum 
benefits for each age at death of spouse A is in the cell with the heavy border.   Based upon the maximum benefits 
received, strategy 3, early start of benefits as soon as younger spouse is eligible, provides the most benefits through 
age of death at 75.  In strategy 3, the total benefits received by the couple by age 75 of spouse A is $378,288, which 
is more than either strategy 1 or 2.  Strategy 1, however, provides the largest life time benefits assuming the 
surviving spouse lives to 90.   
 
For age of death at 80, strategy 1, “restricted application” has the largest benefits for both spouses 
according to total individual benefits received by 80 for spouse A ($435,735), and for life time benefits received by 
the couple ($1,157,837).   Note that for all death ages of spouse A (75, 80, 85, and 90), the benefits received by 
spouse B during the relevant time period are equal for strategy 1 and strategy 3.  Strategy 2 maximizes benefits to 
spouse B ($225,072 and $295,401 respectively) given an age at death of spouse A at 85 and 90.    
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Except for age of death at 75, the benefits to spouse A are greatest for strategy 1.  For age of death at 75, 
strategy 3 (early start) provides the greatest benefits to spouse A.  For couples, strategy 1 maximizes total life time 
benefits across all age of death categories except for the event of spouse “A” living to 90.  If spouse A were to live 
to 90, strategy 2 maximizes the life time benefits for couples ($1,271,878)  
 
Table 14 
Comparison Of Strategies 
Strategy 
Age At Death 
Of Spouse A 
Benefits Received 
By A 
Benefits 
Received By B 
Total Benefits Received By 
Couple During Life Of A 
Total Life Time Benefits 
Received By Couple 
1 75 $249,950 $101,736 $349,686 $1,100,817 
2 75 $225,342 $84,402 $309,744 $1,060,873 
3 75 $276,552 $101,736 $378,288 $992,853 
      
1 80 $435,735 $158,256 $593,991 $1,157,837 
2 80 $413,127 $154,737 $567,864 $1,131,206 
3 80 $430,192 $158,256 $588,448 $1,049,373 
      
1 85 $623,520 $214,776 $838,296 $1,213,857 
2 85 $600,912 $225,072 $825,984 $1,201,540 
3 85 $583,832 $214,776 $798,608 $1,105,893 
      
1 90 $811,297 $271,296 $1,082,593 $1,270,377 
2 90 $788,689 $295,401 $1,084,090 $1,271,878 
3 90 $737,476 $271,296 $1,008,772 $1,162,413 
 
In other words, the three strategies considered deliver optimal benefits at different ages based upon the age 
of death for spouse A.  Strategy 3 (early start of benefits) would provide the largest benefits ($378,288) to the couple 
at age of death at 75 for A.  Strategy 1 provides the largest benefits to the couple at the age of death of 80 and 85 for 
spouse A ($593,991 and $838,296, respectively).  Strategy 2 provides slightly larger benefits (about fifteen hundred 
dollars over the life time of the couple) if spouse A lives to 90 or beyond ($1,084,090 for strategy 2 compared to 
$1,082,593 for strategy 1).   
 
The overall results are summarized in Table 15, Optimal Strategy By Dollars By Age Of Death Of Spouse 
A.  If you are spouse “A”, and believe that you are likely to die before you reach your expected life span, strategy 3 
provides the largest amount of benefits to you separately and to you and your spouse collectively at your age of 
death of 75 ($276,552 and $378,288 respectively.)  However, if spouse B would live to 90, the life time benefits 
received by the couple are greater for strategy 1 ($1,100,817) compared to strategy 3 ($992,853).  For spouse “A”, 
age of death 80, strategy 1 provides the largest amount of benefits to you (spouse A) and to you and your spouse 
collectively ($435,735 and $1,157,837 respectively.)  For spouse “A”, age of death 85, strategy 1 provides the 
largest amount of benefits to you (spouse A) and to you and your spouse collectively ($623,520 and $1,213,857 
respectively.)   
 
If spouse “A” survives until 90, strategy 2 becomes more rewarding compared to strategy 1 based upon 
total benefits to the couple.  The total benefits received by the couple during life of “A” are greater for strategy 2 
compared to strategy 1 by $1497 (= $1,084,090 - $1,082,593.)  The total life time benefits received by the couple 
are greater for strategy 2 compared to strategy 1 by $1501 (= $1,271,878 -$1,270,377).   However, for individual 
benefits to spouse “A” surviving to age 90, strategy 1 continues to be the more rewarding at $811,297.  
 
Table 15 
Optimal Strategy By Dollars By Age Of Death Of Spouse A 
Age of Death of Spouse A 75 80 85 90 
Strategy Which Maximizes Benefits to Spouse A During Life of Spouse A  3 1 1 1 
Maximum Benefit to Spouse A During Life of Spouse A $276,552 $435,735 $623,520 $811,297 
Strategy Which Maximizes Total Life Time Benefits to Couple 1 1 1 2 
Maximum Total Life Time Benefits to Couple  $1,100,817 $1,157,837 $1,213,857 $1,271,878 
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STRATEGY SELECTION, MORTALITY, AND LONGEVITY RISK 
 
Based upon comparison of the three strategies, which strategy is preferable (Spiegelman, 2011; Turner, 
2010)?  Although the dollar amounts likely to be received in benefits can be computed with various assumptions, 
what about life expectancy itself?  Clearly, if a spouse has poor health and a low expected lifespan, would not an 
immediate start of benefits be the best strategy?   
 
A review of the recent actuarial life tables (2007) provided by Social Security Administration 
(http://www.ssa.gov.oact/STATS/table4c6.html) offers some sobering assessments of long term strategies.  At 67 
years, a male has an expected life span of 15.77 years.  Based upon the strategies presented in this paper, a life 
expectancy of 82.77 years suggests that strategy 1 would be preferable.  About half of the men at 67 could expect to 
live to 82.77 years and collect the larger benefits computed for strategy 1.   
 
Another look at the actuarial life table illustrates the risk.  The table notes that about 76,929 men out of 
every 100,000 born reach 67 years.  (Yes, that’s right, by 67 years of age, 23,071 men out of 100,000 are already 
deceased.)  What is the likelihood of the 67 year old male surviving until 75?  At 75 years of age, only 61,612 males 
remain—15,317 have passed on.  About 19.9% of men living at 67 will die before or at 75 years.  At 80 years of 
age, only 47,974 men remain—13,638 have passed.  About 22.1% of men living at 75 will die before or at 80 years.  
According to the actuarial tables, only 47,974 men out of the 76,929 alive at 67 will survive to 80—about 62.4%. 
 
Considering this cheery news, what about our strategies? Realistically, we are all mortal and likely to pass 
away unexpectedly.  However, we know from actuarial tables that the probability of a 67 year old man living to 80 
years is about 62.4% and the odds of living to 82.77 years are about 50-50.  Strategy 1 provides the “best” return for 
the average couple considering male life expectancy.   
 
However, there is another important consideration besides life expectancy: longevity risk (Reichenstein and 
Meyer, 2011).  Reichenstein and Meyer define longevity risk as the risk that a couple will deplete their financial 
portfolio during their lifetime.  In fact, many retirees express great fear of inflation or financial market disorder and 
a recent Allianz poll (2010) found that 61% of individuals would rather die than run out of money. 
 
Comparing the total benefits accumulated across a life time for couples, strategy 1 provides the most 
cumulative benefits for couples at all ages of death for spouse “A” except 90.  If spouse “A” lives to 90 years of age, 
strategy 2 gains about $1500 more over the joint life span of the couple.  Based upon cumulative benefits, strategy 1 
and 2 would be the most likely to address longevity risk.  However, given the greater benefits of strategy 1 for 
couples at all other ages of death for spouse “A”, it would seem that strategy 1 provides the greatest benefits to 
spouse “A” and provides the largest benefits to couples given the alternative ages of death for spouse “A”. 
 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This paper presents analysis of three strategies to find which strategy provides optimal social security 
benefits to couples.  It is assumed that the couples have a greater than average age difference of 5 years and that the 
couple has a ratio of PIA’s of 0.5 or greater (lower PIA/higher PIA) based upon their individual work records.  The 
focus on couples with these characteristics arises because of the sparse analysis provided in popular social security 
reference books and pamphlets.   The age difference of 5 years or greater occurs in about one third of US marriages 
and the ratio of 0.5 is typical for baby boomer households in which both partners have worked throughout most of 
their lives. The above average age difference reduces the number of years in which joint strategy actions can be 
developed.  The 5 year difference assumed in this analysis indicates that the older spouse will be a year past full 
retirement age by the year that the younger spouse becomes eligible for social security benefits. 
 
As noted earlier, there are basically two strategies that are available to couples to jointly maximize social 
security benefits: “claim and suspend” and “restricted application”.  Both strategies require at least one spouse to be 
at FRA.  The 0.5 ratio assumption precludes “claim and suspend” because the younger spouse can receive greater 
benefits on their own retirement benefits versus spousal benefits.  Consequently, the only remaining joint strategy is 
“restricted application.”  In addition to the “restricted application, however, the spouses can still explore starting 
individual benefits early or late and evaluating the joint cumulative life benefits.  
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The three strategies evaluated in this analysis are (1) Restricted application (2) Delayed Start--both spouses 
beginning benefits when the oldest spouse is 70, and (3) Early Start--both spouses beginning benefits when the 
youngest spouse is 62.  As summarized in Table 14 and Table 15, strategy 1—“restricted application” –provides the 
largest comparative benefits for the life time benefits of the couple until 90 years age of death of spouse A.  Also, 
the benefits received by spouse A during that individual’s life time are greatest for strategy 1 except in the case of a 
life span below average life expectancy. 
 
In regards to longevity risk, strategy 1 and strategy 2 provide the maximum DRC benefits for spouse A and 
the maximum survivor benefit for spouse B.  There are two points to consider here.  First, spouse A had the highest 
PIA and the survivor benefit is greatest with the DRC of 32% added to the highest PIA.  Second, even if spouse B 
delayed their start of benefits until 70 years of age, the survivor benefit will begin with the death of spouse A.  As 
earlier work has shown (Hebein, 2011), it takes about 12.5 years to “catch up” from a delayed start of benefits.  (To 
make the impact of delayed start easier to understand, think of four years of forgone earnings at 1.0 per year.  
Starting benefits at 1.32—32% DRC-- in year 5, requires 12.5 years (= 4.0/.32) to recapture the forgone earnings.)  
Since spouse A is 5 years older, spouse A would already be at 87.5 years—5 years past life expectancy—before 
spouse B would “break even” based on their decision to delay start of benefits.  Therefore, it makes financial sense 
not to maximize spouse B benefits by delaying start of benefits past FRA to gain DRC. 
 
Given the consideration of maximizing life time benefits and minimizing longevity risk by gaining a higher 
survivor benefit, strategy 1 is supported by the preceding analysis as the “best” choice of the three alternatives 
reviewed.  Of course, if spouse A has a critical health issue that substantially reduces life span, strategy 3 would 
provide the highest benefits until the mid or late 70’s in age of spouse A.  However, if immediate cash requirements 
are not pressing, the surviving spouse receives the greatest benefits from strategy 1 even given an early age of death 
such as 75 for spouse A. 
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